In re Estate of Stamm
 2006-Ohio-5176 (10/2/06)

          Decedent’s estate was approximately $1.4 million, either in the estate, a family trust or annuities. Disputes arose between the decedent’s wife and his sons regarding the interpretation and application of the will and the trust. A global settlement was reached which provided that the sons would receive certain assets. Spouse failed to tender most of the funds and sons filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement and to show cause to compel spouse to deliver the funds.
          Following a hearing, the magistrate upheld the settlement agreement and spouse objected with regard to one certificate of deposit, arguing that the inclusion of the CD was due to a misrepresentation by the estate attorney and since the agreement was based on mistake, it should not be binding. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and spouse appealed.
          The court of appeals found no evidence of misrepresentation on behalf of the attorney. The doctrine of mutual mistake applies when the intention of the parties is frustrated by the mutual mistake. Here, the agreement was a global settlement to avoid a will construction and other court involvement. The mistaken inclusion of the CD does not frustrate this purpose.
          Spouse also argued that the CD automatically became hers after her husband’s death since it was joint and survivorship to her. The appellate court found that regardless whether the CD became hers at death, she entered into a binding contract to deliver the funds to the sons.
          Spouse also alleged magistrate erred in signing the settlement agreement as a witness. Appellate court found no harm in witnessing a written agreement signed in the court’s presence since a court may adopt as its judgement oral agreements entered into by the parties in its presence.

Tomasik v. Tomasik
 111 Ohio St.3d 481, 2006-Ohio-6109

          On May 2, 2003, a Certificate of Service of Notice of Probate of Will was filed. On August 28, 2003, five nieces and nephews filed an action to contest the will alleging lack of testamentary capacity. These relatives were beneficiaries under a previous will. The decedent’s sister and mother of the contestors received notice of the admission of the will to probate. None of the other contestors were in the category of persons to whom it was required that notice be given under R.C. 2107.19.
         The trial court dismissed the will contest action, finding that it was not filed within the three month statute of limitations set forth in the version of R.C. 2107.76 applicable at the time. The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the statute of limitations in the prior version of the statute only applied to those persons to whom it was required under R.C. 2107.19 that notice e given of the will’s admission to probate.
         The appellate decision was affirmed. The only persons held to the three-month statute of limitations period under the former version of the statute were those who must be given notice of a will’s admission to probate under R.C. 2107.19.

Sudnek v. Klein
(2001), 125 Ohio App.3d 336

          In this case, the 11th District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 2113.30 applies to corporations with a single shareholder rather than just sole proprietorships or unincorporated businesses.  R.C. 2113.30 requires the executor or administrator to obtain the permission of the probate court in order to continue the business of the decedent for more than one month, and to file monthly reports setting forth receipts and expenses.

In re Name Change of Handley
(2000), 107 Ohio Misc. 2d 24.

          In this case, an individual who wore a full white beard and wire glasses and who portrayed Santa Claus at various events, failed to establish reasonable and proper cause sufficient to allow an application to change his name to "Santa Robert Claus". While no fraudulent intent existed, allowing the change of name would be a violation of public policy.  The individual sought to assume the identity of a cultural icon in which the public had a proprietary right and interest and approving the change would be very confusing to children in the community.

Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd.
(2000), 90 Ohio St. 3d 176

          When an involuntarily committed mentally ill person poses an imminent threat of harm to himself or others, the state's interest in protecting its citizens outweighs the patient's interest in refusing anti-psychotic medication.  Whether the patient poses an imminent threat of harm to himself or others warranting the administration of anti-psychotic drugs against the patient's will is uniquely a medical, rather than a judicial, determination to be made by a qualified physician.  A physician may order the forced medication of an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient with anti-psychotic drugs when the physician determines that (1) the patient presents an imminent danger of harm to himself or others, (2) there are no less intrusive means of avoiding the threatened harm and (3) the medication to be administered is medically appropriate for the patient.